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Abstract
The lack of complete information of the government has been considered as a barrier to
the optimal regulation, as it is well-known in price regulations literature. However, it is not true
for the entry regulation: This paper shows that the performance of the entry regulation under
incomplete information can be better than that under complete information. Under incomplete
information, the incumbent ﬁrm would deviate from the monopoly behavior to signal itself as
an eﬃcient type and to trigger entry regulation which prevents excess entry in case that the
incumbent is eﬃcient. As a result, social welfare can be even higher than under complete
information, since not only the optimal post-entry market structure is achieved as under
complete information but the pre-entry price is even lower than that under complete
information.
Keywords: incomplete information, excess entry, entry regulation, signaling
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, L51
I. Introduction
Since the seminal works by Akerlof(1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz(1976), Spence(1973),
and some others, incomplete information has been considered as a major cause of market
failure. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems either make it impossible for a market
under incomplete information to reach an equilibrium, or make the market equilibrium
suboptimal compared to the case of complete information.
Consider Spence(1973)ʼs job market signaling model as an example. The equilibrium in
Spenceʼs model is ineﬃcient because of the excess education by the worker. In Spence,
education is socially wasteful since it doesnʼt increase workerʼs productivity, but only plays the
role of signaling. If information were complete, the socially costly education would not be
necessary. The only reason for a worker to invest into education is to signal himself under
incomplete information.
However, what if the market signaling is through donation, something that contributes to
the social welfare, instead of the wasteful education?
1 There is no diﬀerence between donation
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 51 (2010), pp.99-113. Ⓒ Hitotsubashi Universityand education in terms of signaling eﬀect since any costly action can be a signaling device.
However, if workers use donation, instead of education, as the signaling device, the equilibrium
in the Spenceʼs job market signaling model may not be suboptimal any longer. Actually if we
assume that one-dollar donation contributes more than one-dollar to the other members in the
society, then excess donation, not excess education, will make social welfare under incomplete
information even higher than that under complete information.
2
The possibility of welfare improvement under incomplete information is already
demonstrated, for example, in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) . In Milgrom and Roberts,
particularly in the separating equilibrium, the more eﬃcient type of incumbent ﬁrm chooses a
lower price than the monopoly level to transmit information to the potential entrant and to
discourage its entry. Since there would have also been no entry under complete information, the
social welfare improves under incomplete information due to the lowered monopoly price in the
pre-entry stage.
3 Even though Milgrom and Roberts do not stress the possibility of welfare
improvement under incomplete information as the main result, they surely point out this
important issue in relation to the publicpolic y.
4
Can we expect the same result in government regulation? In other words, can the
government do better under incomplete information than under complete information in
regulations? Contrary to the free market interactions, the issue in regulations is maximizing
social welfare without a constraint or with a constraint by the benevolent dictator, where the
constraint is the lack of complete information. Therefore, it seems trivial that the government
can surely do better without the constraint of incomplete information. The theory of optimal
price regulation under incomplete information conﬁrms such a prediction.
5 The standard trade-
oﬀ between rent extraction and incentive provision implies that the optimal regulation under
incomplete information can only be the second-best, not the ﬁrst-best.
However, such a pessimism regarding optimality of the government intervention under
incomplete information is not suitable for entry regulations contrary to the case of price
regulations. Assume that the government lets the informed party, the incumbent ﬁrm, signal
ﬁrst against entry regulation. Then the incumbent ﬁrm will make costly expenditure to identify
(or to misidentify) its own type to induce governmentʼs entry regulation and to protect its
monopoly position. In such case, if the signal by the incumbent ﬁrm is a donation to the whole
society, the governmentʼs entry regulation will do better under incomplete information than
under complete information. Actually we can expect such a result if price is the signaling
device and the ﬁrm has an incentive to send a low price signal against a regulation to induce
entry regulation and to deter potential competitors. A low price is clearly a donation to the
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1 Even though education may also contribute to the social welfare in reality, we just follow the assumption in
Spence. Donation refers to anything that improves social welfare, not just a transfer from the donator to the society.
Education investment which contributes to the whole society more than the education costs, contrary to the case of
Spence, can be interpreted as donation.
2 The possibility of the multiplying eﬀect of donation is the counterpart of the distortionary tax in regulation theory.
See Laﬀont and Tirole(1993) for the regulation analysis under the assumption of distortionary publicfund; the soc ial
cost of one-dollar tax is more than one-dollar. If donation saves public spending, that is, if it reduces tax, then donation
is surely welfare-increasing.
3 In the pooling equilibrium, the social welfare can also be higher under incomplete information since the less
eﬃcient incumbent type would produce more than its monopoly level to mimic the low cost type. However, in this
case, since entry, which would have occurred under complete information, is limited, we have to compare welfare
increment due to low pre-entry price and welfare loss due to less competition in the future.whole society since the social welfare is increasing as the price goes down. This is the
motivation of the paper.
In this paper, in a simple model a la Milgrom and Roberts(1982), we will show that the
performance of entry regulation can be even better under incomplete information than under
complete information. If the incumbentʼs and the entrantʼs production costs are not correlated,
the entry, which incurs some ﬁxed cost, will be socially desirable if the incumbent ﬁrm is
ineﬃcient, and it will be socially wasteful if the incumbent is eﬃcient.
6 Therefore, to induce
entry regulation, the low cost type incumbent will choose a lower price than the monopoly
level to signal itself against the high cost type (separating equilibrium). The low price by the
incumbent monopolist is the donation to the whole society because one-dollar loss in ﬁrmʼs
proﬁt due to the lowered price brings more than one-dollar beneﬁt to the consumer surplus. The
incentive of the high cost incumbent to mimic the low cost type can also be welfare-increasing
by the same logic( pooling equilibrium).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes a simple signaling model of
an entry regulation under incomplete information. Section III derives the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the signaling game which passes the Intuitive Criterion by Cho and Kreps(1987).
Section IV compares the performance of the entry regulation under incomplete information with
that under complete information, and shows that the former is better than the latter in most
cases. Section V allows the government to move ﬁrst and choose the best entry regulation
which is conditional on the incumbentʼs ﬁrst period price. Since ex-ante screening can generate
any ex-post signaling outcome, such a screening mechanism by the government will clearly
make entry regulation under incomplete information more eﬃcient than that under complete
information. Section VI concludes the paper with some remarks.
II. A Signaling Model of Entry Regulation
Consider a two-stage three-person entry game as in Figure 1
7. In the beginning of the
game, nature N selects ﬁrm 1ʼs type, the constant marginal cost c1,w h i chi se i t h e r0o r2w i t h
probability a and (1,a) respectively, a (0, 1). Firm 1 knows its own cost, however, a
potential entrant and the government only knows the probability distribution.
At t1, ﬁrm 1 is the monopolist and chooses a price p
M, which may be diﬀerent from the
single-period monopoly proﬁt maximizing price p
M＊ for the strategicentry deterrenc e. At t2,
ﬁrm 2 makes a decision on entry. If ﬁrm 2 decides to enter (IN), the benevolent government G
implements an entry regulation and either allows (Y) or regulates (N) ﬁrm 2ʼs entry. If ﬁrm 2
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4 Schmidt(1996) also shows that, by comparing privatized and nationalized ﬁrms, the productive eﬃciency of a
regulated ﬁrm may be better enhanced when the government has only incomplete information about ﬁrmʼs cost, that is,
when the ﬁrm is privatized.
5 See Baron(1989), Baron and Myerson(1982), Laﬀont(1994), and Laﬀont and Tirole(1986, 1993) for the optimal
incentive monopoly regulation under incomplete information.
6 The possibility that free market generates too many ﬁrms is known as the excess entry theorem. See Mankiw and
Whinston(1986), Perry(1984), and Suzumura and Kiyono(1987) for the excess entry theorem as the logical basis of an
entry regulation, and Kim(1997, 2003) for the critic about the excess entry theorem.
7 Figure 1 is a reduced form such that the second period subgames are simpliﬁed by the equilibrium payoﬀs in each
subgame.does not enter (OUT) or the government regulates ﬁrm 2ʼs entry, then ﬁrm 1 maintains its
monopoly position and chooses p
M＊ because there is no further strategic reason to choose other
prices than the static monopoly price.
To highlight the eﬃciency of entry regulation under incomplete information, we assume
that the monopoly price is not regulated. If ﬁrm 2ʼs entry is allowed by the government, then
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 play a Cournot competition game.
8 Firm 2ʼs unit cost, which is assumed to
be 2 without loss of any generality, and the entry cost F are common knowledge known to ﬁrm
1 and to the government. We assume the same inverse demand function in both periods such as
p=10,X, where p is the market price and X is the total production level. Finally, players do
not discount future payoﬀs.
In Figure 1, payoﬀso ft h eﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2, and the government are represented in this
sequence both in the monopoly subgame M and in the duopoly subgame D.F i r m1 ʼsp a y o ﬀ is
the two-period total proﬁt, which is equal to p
M(p
M)+p





1 in case of entry. Firm 2ʼsp a y o ﬀ is the Cournot Nash equilibrium proﬁt net of entry
co s ti nca s eo fe n t r y ,a n d0i nca s eo fn oe n t r y .T h ep a y o ﬀ of the government is the second
period social welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts, net of entry cost in
case of entry.
9
Table 1 summarizes market outcomes for both periods depending on the market structure.
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [December 102
8 We can introduce price regulations on the monopoly and/or post-entry duopoly markets without aﬀecting the main
results of the paper.
9 Note that the payoﬀs of the players actually depend on ﬁrm 1ʼs type, the true unit cost.
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YUnder monopoly, at t1 as well as at t2 in case of no entry, p
M(p
M|c1) is the monopoly ﬁrmʼs
proﬁt with unit cost c1 when it chooses p
M,a n dW
M (p
M | c1) is the social welfare of the
monopoly market measured at price p
M. Meanwhile, p
M＊ and W
M＊ are the monopoly proﬁta n d
the social welfare of the monopoly market respectively both measured by p
M＊. Finally, the
market outcomes of the duopoly in t2 with entry are all measured by the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium price.
Assumption 1. 0.5CFC4.
Figure 2 will help us understand why we focus on some intermediate values of the entry
cost as in Assumption 1. If entry cost is suﬃciently low, that is if F)0.5, then entry is
desirable not only to ﬁrm 2 but to the whole society, regardless of the type of the incumbent
monopolist. This is not the interesting case and so will be ignored, since there is no strategic
issue regarding entry regulation. On the other hand, if entry cost is suﬃciently high, that is if
F(4, then entry is blockaded by the eﬃcient incumbent type, and so there will be no strategic
issue related to the government entry regulation, either. In this case, the ineﬃcient type
incumbent might have incentive to mimic the eﬃcient type, however, if it succeeds, entry will
also be blockaded and the governmentʼs entry regulation becomes redundant. Since our interest
is the strategic interaction between the informed incumbent and the uninformed government, we
will also exclude such case without losing any points.
Finally, if entry cost belongs to the range in Assumption 1, entry is desirable to the
potential entrant regardless of the incumbentʼs type and so cannot be blockaded even by the
eﬃcient type incumbent monopolist. However, entry is socially excessive in case that the
incumbent is of the eﬃcient type (and it is socially desirable in case of the ineﬃcient
incumbent). We will focus on such case where the ineﬃcient type incumbent has incentive to
mimic eﬃcient type and the eﬃcient type has incentive to distinguish itself from the ineﬃcient
type both to induce entry regulation and protect its monopoly position. The uninformed
government then use incumbentʼs price as a signal about the true type of the monopolist and
will decide on entry permission.
If entry cost belongs to the range in Assumption 1, ﬁrm 2 will always choose to enter
since p
D＊
2 (c1)BF regardless of the true value of c1, and so we can focus on the strategic


























































8interaction between the informed monopolist and the uninformed government regarding entry
regulation under incomplete information. Because there is no strategic links between pre-entry
and post-entry market demands, and so the strategic entry deterrence by ﬁrm 1 itself is not
feasible, the market structure at t2 is solely determined by the governmentʼs entry regulation.
Therefore, the original entry game can be simpliﬁed to a two-person game with incomplete
information between the incumbent and the government. The incumbent ﬁrmʼs price p
M at t1
plays the role of signaling about c1. Firm 1 will choose an optimal p
M which maximizes two
period total proﬁt under entry regulation, and the benevolent government implements an




M＊(c1) be the welfare increment due to entry at t2 as a function
of c1. Then the optimal entry regulation is allowing entry if bW(c1)BF and disallowing entry if
bW(c1))F. Figure 2 describes bW(c1) in comparison with p
D＊
2 (c1)a n dF. Figure 2 conﬁrms
that, under Assumption 1, ﬁrm 2 always wants to enter the market, however, entry is socially
desirable when c1=2 and it is excessive when c1=0.
Entry may be socially excessive when the new entry incurs business-stealing eﬀect. The
business-stealing eﬀect is represented by p
D＊
2 (c1)(bW(c1) in Figure 2, which implies that a
new entry is more attractive to the entrant than to the whole society.
10 This is the situation that
the new entrant steals some proﬁt from the incumbent, and so the welfare increment due to a
new entry is less than the entrantʼs proﬁt. The business-stealing eﬀect is the key factor which
justiﬁes the entry regulation by the benevolent government.
If information is complete, entry regulation improves social welfare by preventing ﬁrm 2ʼs
entry in case of c1=0 and allowing entry when the incumbentʼs cost is high, that is, c1=2.
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10 See Mankiw and Whinston(1986) for the business-stealing eﬀect of an entry.








c1However, since the government has only incomplete information in our model, we need to
solve the signaling game to ﬁnd out an optimal entry regulation.
In this section, we will derive a full set of perfect Bayesian equilibria which pass Cho and
Krepsʼ Intuitive Criterion. Let (p
M, E, B) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where p
M is the
strategy of the incumbent ﬁrm, E is the governmentʼs entry regulation, and B is the
governmentʼs belief about incumbentʼs type.
Separating Equilibrium
Consider a separating equilibrium ﬁrst. In the separating equilibrium, if it exists, the low
cost incumbent would set the price in t1 low enough to make the high cost unable to mimic.
The high cost incumbent will then choose the monopoly price p
M＊ in t1 since it cannot prevent
entry in t2 by mimicking the low cost type. Proposition 1 summarizes such a separating
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique separating equilibrium which passes the Intuitive Criterion







E : disallow entry "p
M [0, 3.019] and allow entry "p
M (3.019,  )
B : m(c1=0|p
M)=1 "p
M [0, 3.019] and m(c1=0|p
M)=0 "p







M(c1=2) are the strategies of the incumbent ﬁrms with low and
high cost respectively, and m(c1|p
M) is the governmentʼs belief that ﬁrm 1 who sends signal p
M
is of type c1.
Proof Refer to Figure 3 for proof. Assume that the government has a belief system such that m
(c1=0|p)=1, "p [0, p ¯] and m(c1=0|p)=0, "p (p ¯,  ). Note that p ¯)p
M＊
0 =5. This is
because, otherwise, both types of incumbent will choose p
M＊
0 =5 and then there will be no
separating equilibrium. First consider the eﬃcient type of incumbent. If it would choose a price
in the interval (p ¯,  ), it will choose p
M＊





0 . If it would choose a price in the interval [0, p ¯], it would choose p ¯, and the




0 .F o rt h ee ﬃcient type incumbent to









0 ,t h a ti s ,p ¯B2 should hold. Now consider the behavior of the ineﬃcient type. By the
same logic as above, for the ineﬃcient type to choose a price which is consistent with








2 , which implies that p ¯C3.019.
Combining both typesʼ optimal strategies, we have 2Cp ¯C3.019. However, by Cho and Krepʼs
intuitive criterion, all prices in the interval 2Cp ¯)3.019 are equilibrium dominated for the
ineﬃcient incumbent, and therefore, it should be that p ¯=3.019.
11 F i n a l l y ,i ti se a s yt oc o n ﬁrm
that all the playersʼ strategies are sequentially rational and the governmentʼs belief is consistent.
Q.E.D.
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11 The Intuitive Criterion is as follows: The ineﬃcient type will never send a signal in the interval of 2Cp ¯)3.019
because the maximum proﬁt by choosing a price in this interval is smaller than the proﬁt by choosing the equilibrium
price.In the unique separating equilibrium with reﬁnement, the low cost type incumbent deviates
from the monopoly behavior and chooses a lower price than p
M＊
0 =5 and the high cost type
incumbent chooses p
M＊
2 =6. The entry is regulated when the incumbent is of low cost type, and
it is allowed when the incumbent is of high cost type.
If the equilibrium is separating, since the government can tell the true cost of the
incumbent just by observing the ﬁrst period market price, it can implement the optimal entry
regulation as under complete information, that is, allowing entry if and only if the incumbent is
of high cost type.
Pooling Equilibrium
Now consider a pooling equilibrium, where the incentive of the high cost incumbent to
mimic the low cost type dominates low cost incumbentʼs separating incentive. In the pooling
equilibrium, the high cost incumbent chooses the same price as that chosen by the low cost
incumbent and successfully maintains its monopoly position through entry regulation, which
would not be possible under complete information.
Proposition 2.I fa)
80,18F
71 , then there exists no pooling equilibrium.
Proof In any pooling equilibrium, the government cannot distinguish the low cost type from the










9 ,F in case entry being allowed. Therefore, the optimal
strategy of the government is to allow entry if and only if a)
80,18F
71 . In this case, since the
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FIG.3 . E QUILIBRIUM















M= (p-2)(10-p) government always allows entry regardless of the ﬁrst period price, there is no incentive for
any type incumbent to deviate from its monopoly proﬁt maximizing price. This means that
there doesnʼt exist any pooling equilibrium where the high cost type mimics the pricing
behavior of the low cost type incumbent. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 says, when the chance that the incumbent monopolist is an eﬃcient type is
small, there exists no pooling equilibrium. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows;
when the high and the low cost type choose the same price, if the incumbent monopolist is
more likely a high cost type, then the optimal entry regulation should be allowing entry,
therefore the high cost type will not mimic the low cost typeʼs pricing.
Proposition 2 also implies that when the probability of being an eﬃcient type is
suﬃciently high, there exists a pooling equilibrium. However, as usual in many signaling
games, the pooling equilibrium may not be unique. Actually we have a continuum of pooling
equilibria, some of which might be unreasonable since they are based on unreasonable beliefs
on the oﬀ-the-equilibrium paths. We want to delete such unreasonable pooling equilibria by




71 , then there exist pooling equilibria which pass the Intuitive







E : disallow entry "p
M [0, pp] and allow entry "p
M (pp,  )
B : m(c1=0|p
M)=a for "p
M [0, pP]a n dm(c1=0|p
M)=0 for "p
M (pP,  ).
Proof Without loss of generality, suppose that the government holds a reasonable belief system
B such that m(c1=0|p)=a for "p [0, pP]a n dm(c1=0|p)=0 for "p (pP,  ). With such
belief, the government will allow entry for "p (pP,  ) and reject entry for "p [0, pP],
given aB
80,18F
71 . In order for such belief by the government to be consistent with optimal
behavior of the incumbent monopolist, the following sequential rationality conditions for both
types should be satisﬁed in a pooling equilibrium. First note that if pP )3.019 then the
ineﬃcient type will never mimic eﬃcient typeʼs behavior. Therefore for the pooling
equilibrium, pPB3.019 should hold. Meanwhile, if pP(p
M＊
0 =5, then the eﬃcient type will
choose p
M＊
0 =5 and the ineﬃcient type will choose a price greater that p
M＊
2 =5, which means no
pooling equilibrium. Therefore, it should be true that pPCp
M＊
0 =5. Finally, for 3.019CpPC5,
both types will choose pP.W eh a v ei n ﬁnitely many pooling equilibria, and they all pass the
Intuitive Criterion. Q.E.D.
In a pooling equilibrium, both types choose the same price in the interval of [3.019, 5],
which includes p
M＊
0 =5, and entry is regulated regardless of the incumbentʼs type. If a is high
enough, the government will regulate entry even when it cannot tell the true type of the
incumbent monopolist. Therefore the high cost type incumbent should have incentive to mimic
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which were impossible under complete information and/or under separating equilibrium.
IV. Eﬃciency of Entry Regulation under Incomplete Information
Now, let us show that signaling by the incumbent ﬁrm makes entry regulation under
incomplete information more eﬃcient than that under complete information.
Proposition 4. (Optimality of the Unique Separating Equilibrium) At the unique separating
equilibrium which passes Cho and Krepsʼ Intuitive Criterion, entry regulation is more eﬃcient
under incomplete information than under complete information.
Proof Incomplete information generates the same optimal market structure at t2 as under
complete information. Furthermore, since the eﬃcient type incumbent deviates from the
monopoly pricing to signal its identity, the ﬁrst periodʼs social welfare is enhanced under
incomplete information. Therefore, the outcome under incomplete information is strictly better
than under complete information; the same optimal market structure in the future and the lower
(same) market price today in case that the incumbent is of eﬃcient (ineﬃcient) type. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 implies that the incomplete information is not necessarily a cause of
ineﬃciency, rather it can generate supra-optimal outcome as in the case of governmentʼs entry
regulation. We already show that, while there always exists a unique separating equilibrium, the
pooling equilibrium doesnʼt exist when a)
80,18F
71 . Therefore, in case of a)
80,18F
71 ,
Proposition 4 becomes stronger and we can certainly predict that entry regulation is clearly
more eﬃcient under incomplete information than under complete information.
Meanwhile, if aB
80,18F
71 then there also exist pooling equilibria, and so we may not
guarantee the supra-optimality of entry regulation under incomplete information. However we
can show that, even at the pooling equilibria, the eﬃciency of the entry regulation under
incomplete information also holds almost surely.
Proposition 5. (Ex-post Eﬃciency of the Pooling Equilibrium) When the incumbent is of low
cost type, the pooling equilibrium under incomplete information is always more eﬃcient than
the complete information equilibrium. When the incumbent is of high cost type, pooling
equilibria with pp [3.019, 4.848] are more eﬃcient than the complete information equilibrium
and those with pp (4.848, 5] are more eﬃcient than the complete information equilibrium for







C(c1) for c1=0, 2, where the superscripts P and C represent
pooling (under incomplete information) and complete information respectively, and SW is the
two period total social welfare. Then, bSW(c1=0)=6
t  @
Xt
0 p(s)ds ,75 for X1=10,pP and X2
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [December 108=5, and bSW(c1=2)=6
t  @
Xt
0 p(s)ds,2Xt ,(52.44,F) for X1=10,pP and X2=4.
First note that bSW(c1=0)B0 is always satisﬁed for all pPC5. Therefore, if the incumbent is
the eﬃcient type, then the incomplete information always brings a higher eﬃciency than the
complete information in governmentʼs entry regulation. Next, if the incumbent is the ineﬃcient
type, bSW(c1=2)B0 is also guaranteed for all ppC4.848. Meanwhile if pp(4.848 then, bSW





We can explain the optimality of the pooling equilibrium in most cases in the following
four steps: First, any pooling equilibrium is more eﬃcient than the complete information
equilibrium if the incumbent is of low cost type. Second, when the incumbent is of high cost
type, all the pooling equilibria with pp [3.019, 4.848] are also more eﬃcient than the complete
information equilibrium. Third, for those pooling equilibria with pp (4.848, 5], the optimality





even in case of the high cost incumbent, the range of supra-optimality of the pooling
equilibrium is substantially large as is shown in Figure 4.
Since ex-post eﬃciency under incomplete information holds for all pooling equilibria in
the eﬃcient incumbent case and it holds for almost all pooling equilibria in the ineﬃcient
incumbent case, and furthermore since the pooling equilibria more likely exist when the
incumbent is of low cost type, the ex-ante social welfare E(SW)=aSW(c1=0)+(1,a)SW(c1
=2) under the pooling equilibria should be necessarily higher than that under complete
information. Proposition 6 summaries such an ex-ante optimality of the pooling equilibrium of
the governmentʼs entry regulation under incomplete information.
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FIG.4 . R ANGE OF THE EX-POST EFFICIENT POOLING EQUILIBRIA WHEN c1＝2
A: Supra-optimality of the pooling equilibrium 










0 Proposition 6. (Ex-ante Optimality of the Pooling Equilibrium) Entry regulation in the pooling
equilibrium under incomplete information is more eﬃcient than that under complete
information.
Proof The ex-ante welfare diﬀerential between the pooling equilibrium and the complete




2M,F,9.06 , where M=10,pp. Note that for all pp in region A in Figure 4, that
is "pp [3.019, 4.848) or "pp (4.848, 5) and F (F ˆ(pp), 4], it is trivially true that abSW(c1
=0)+(1,a)bSW(c1=2)B0. But "pp (4.848, 5) and F (0.5, F ˆ(pp)), that is for those prices






Therefore, if there exists any pooling equilibrium, then aB
80,18F
71 and so the ex-ante social
welfare under the pooling equilibrium is strictly higher than that under the complete
information. Q.E.D.
V. A Screening Model of Entry Regulation
In this paper, we model entry regulation under incomplete information as a signaling
game, where the informed party, the incumbent monopolist, moves ﬁrst. However, we might
also model the same entry regulation as a screening game where the uninformed government
moves ﬁrst by oﬀering entry condition as a function of the price chosen by the incumbent
monopolist. In this section, we will derive an optimal entry regulation under such a screening
game, rather than under a signaling game, and conﬁrms the optimality of the entry regulation
under incomplete information.
Note that in a screening game of entry regulation, the government can always replicate any
equilibrium outcome of the signaling game. Furthermore, in a screening game, since we donʼt
have to take the belief of the uninformed party into considerations, all signaling equilibria
without any reﬁnements are the possible candidates for the governmentʼs choice. The
benevolent government will choose the best separating equilibrium in case that pooling
equilibrium does not exist. In this case as we see the entry regulation is more eﬃcient under
incomplete information than under complete information.
Meanwhile the government will compare the best separating equilibrium with the best
pooling equilibrium in case that the latter exists, and then choose the better one as the optimal
entry regulation condition. Since we already show that both the best separating and the best
pooling equilibrium dominate the complete information equilibrium, the entry regulation in a
screening game also clearly shows a better performance than under complete information.
Proposition 7 summarizes such an optimal entry regulation in a screening game.




5.6+F  , the optimal entry regulation is allowing entry for
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M (3.019,  ) and reject entry for all p
M [0, 3.019]. Under such entry regulation both
eﬃcient and ineﬃcient types of incumbent monopolist choose the same price p
M=3.019 and




5.6+F , then the optimal entry regulation is allowing entry for all p
M (2,
 ) and reject entry for all p
M [0, 2]. Under such entry regulation, the eﬃcient type of
incumbent monopolist chooses p
M=2with entry being rejected and the ine ﬃcient type chooses
p
M＊
2 =6 with entry being allowed (replicating the best separating equilibrium). T h e
governmentʼs entry regulation in either case shows a better performance than under complete
information.




2 =6, E, B) is the most eﬃcient among all separating
equilibria of the signaling game without any reﬁnement by the Intuitive Criterion, since the




2 =6) as the separating
equilibrium which will be duplicated in the screening game. The ex-post social welfare for both
types of incumbents are SW
S(c1=0)=85.5 and SW
S(c1=2)=52.44,F, and so the ex-ante
social welfare is E
S(SW)=33.06a+52.44,(1,a)F, where the superscript S denotes separat-
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2 =3.019), the ex-post social welfare for both types of incumbents are SW
P
(c1 =0) =82.94 and SW




P(SW) is satisﬁed if aC
3.04+F
5.6+F . Combining with the condition
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FIG.5 . T YPES OF THE EFFICIENT SCREENING EQUILIBRIUM
C: Replicating the best pooling equilibrium 
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The main proposition of this paper is that, while the lack of complete information by the
government is a barrier to the optimal price regulation, it improves the performance of the entry
regulation. This result is based on the following basic observations: First, if incumbentʼsa n d
entrantʼs costs are not correlated, excess entry can occur when the incumbent is more eﬃcient.
Second, the incumbent ﬁrm should have an incentive to signal itself as an eﬃcient type to
induce entry regulation. Finally, therefore, the incumbent ﬁrm will deviate from the monopoly
pricing, which surely is a welfare-increasing donation to the whole society.
Note that if incumbentʼs and entrantʼs costs are positively correlated, the incumbent would
choose a higher price than the monopoly price to signal a high cost of the new entrant to the
government and so to induce entry regulation against excess entry. Since the incumbentʼs
incentive under entry regulation is not consistent with the optimality of the government
regulation, entry regulation under incomplete information becomes suboptimal contrary to the
case of mutually independent costs.
Several issues can be brought up for further research. First, can we ﬁnd other interesting
cases where incomplete information is not the cause of the market failure but the cause of
supra-eﬃciency? This is equivalent to asking if we can ﬁnd other real examples under which
the signaling costs can be donations to the whole economy.
Second, whatʼs the optimal regulation if both entry and price regulations are implemented
at the same time? The government might not be able to implement diﬀerent mechanisms
simultaneously, that is, incentive mechanism for price regulation and signaling mechanism for
entry regulation. This is because the incentive price regulation may not be incentive compatible
any longer if the regulated ﬁrm takes entry regulation into consideration at the same time.
Likewise, the signaling eﬀect in entry regulation may change against price regulation.
Finally, the supra-optimality result of entry regulation under incomplete information might
be an example that, when more than one market failures coexist, one cause of market failure
can mitigate the other market failure problem; the monopolist should deviate from the
monopoly behavior because of the incomplete information problem. Analyzing multiple market
failure problems together seems to be an interesting research issue.
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